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RFID Communications - Who is listening? 
 
Christopher Bolan 
School of Computer and Information Science 
Edith Cowan University 
 
Abstract 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is seeing a surge in awareness across a range of industries as a 
successor to barcoding. The nature of this technology promises a wide range of benefits but it appears to be at 
the expense of security. This paper investigates an eavesdropping attack against an EPC RFID system and 
shows how a simple device may be used to record interactions between both Tag and Readers. The device is 
used to record and decode signals within range and its output is analysed to verify that the attack was indeed 
successful. The findings verify previous assertions by other authors that such attacks are viable and acts as a 
warning to implementers of the standard who expected their transactions to remain private or secure. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As a normal part of their wireless operation RFID systems require no direct physical contact between tag and 
reader and are thus theorized to be highly susceptible to Eavesdropping attacks (Hancke, 2008). Whilst there has 
been some experimentation attacks of this nature against RFID systems, to date much of the focus has been on 
securing the transmission with cryptography (Rashinge, Engels & Cole, 2004;  Knopse & Pohl, 2004). Beyond 
this, previous literature has usually stated that such an attack is possible without detailing experimental proofs or 
methods (Sarma et al., 2002; Juels, 2006). Thus, it seems more than appropriate to review the current standards 
such as the Electronic Product Code Standard (EPC) to demonstrate why and how such an attack would be 
viable (Auto-ID Center, 2002). This paper will thus demonstrate a successful eavesdropping attack on a 
Generation One EPC Compliant system, detailing how the attack was conceived and ultimately carried out using 
a low cost custom device. 
Background 
Historically, there has always been a need for security stemming from the basic principle of protecting assets, 
physical or otherwise, from others. Computer security has tradionally been focused on the protection of data 
from unauthorised disclosure, ensuring the integrity of the data and maintaining the availability of data. In 
computer security circles these principles are known as Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA). The 
underlying ideal of confidentiality is to prevent unauthorised access to data from both internal and external 
sources. Confidentiality is usually supported through the encryption of data (eg. PGP) and access protection 
systems (eg. Passwords, Biometrics etc).  Confidentiality is considered to be breached when unauthorised 
individuals or systems may view information that otherwise would be hidden from them. 
The idea of confidentiality is closely tied to the legal issue of privacy, which is seen by many as the hottest topic 
in modern computer related security (Whitman & Mattord, 2003). While the principle does apply evenly to all 
hidden information in a system, the characteristic value of confidentiality increases with the sensitivity of the 
confidential data. Confidentiality may also cover the aggregation of non-confidential data, for example: 
information may be gathered in small fragments which of themselves are not consider confidential, however the 
aggregation of such fragments may reveal confidential information. 
RFID Eavesdropping 
Radio frequency identification (RFID) technology stems back to Faradays’ discovery that light and radio waves 
were both forms of electromagnetic energy. However, the first concrete step towards the modern conception of 
RFIDs was made by Harry Stockman in his 1948 paper Communication by means of reflected power (Stockman, 
1948). From that discovery, it was not until 1973 the first direct patent on passive RFID tags was lodged in 
America by ComServ (Cardullo, 2005). RFID tags now come in various shapes and sizes including stick on 
labels, tie-on tags, 3mm pellets, and button disks although internally, they consist of a microcontroller and 
attached antenna embedded in a protective material.  
Beyond just tags themselves, every RFID system consists of three major components (Sarma, Weis & Engels, 
2002, p.3): 
• “the RFID tag, or transponder, which is located on the object to be identified and is the data carrier in 
the RFID system,” 
• “the RFID reader, or transceiver, which may be able to both read data from and write data to a 
transponder,” and 
• “the data processing subsystem which utilizes the data obtained from the transceiver in some useful 
manner”. 
The amount of data which may be stored on a RFID tag varies with the tag type; but irregardless of the storage 
capacity the basic principle of operation is for an RFID tag to broadcast upon request. While the broadcast data 
transmission may be encrypted, the lack of computational power on most, if not all RFID tags, means that an 
attacker using a laptop or PC would have greater computational power and thus any encryption would likely be 
overcome (Bolan, 2005). Even if a tag were constructed with sufficient computational power to allow for a 
strong level of encryption this would invariably result in a significant increase in tag cost and thus undermine 
one of the main benefits of current RFID technology.  
Given these basics, confidentiality based attacks on RFID systems would likely be focussed on capturing any 
transceiver/transponder communication; and decoding any encryption used, as well as reading any available 
tags. For example, in a medical environment, such data might reveal to an attacker the location of an item that 
could be of value, or private patient records (Bolan, 2006). Such attacks may be carried out in one of two ways. 
Firstly the attacker could use their own transceiver in order to interrogate an RFID tag. Although, such attacks 
may be detectable if the transceiver is set up in such a way that it logs interactions which may prove unlikely 
due to the resource constraints of RFID tags.The second and perhaps more worrying type of confidentiality 
attack is a passive listening attack on authorised transceiver/transponder communications, referred to as spying 
(Oertel et al., 2004). In this type of attack the attacker simply monitors and records all transmissions which later 
may be used for malicious purposes. Such an attack would be difficult to detect as the attacker is not required to 
actively probe or interact with the system (see figure one below). It should also be noted that attacks of this type 
are often used as the starting step for other more advanced methods (Whitman & Mattord, 2003). 
 
Figure 1 – RFID Eavesdropping Scenario 
METHOD 
Recalling figure one, for an attack of this nature to transpire usually requires an interception of the 
communication between two or more elements of a system. As such attacks are most effective when the 
attacking device is passive the attacker ideally does not supply the communication carrier wave and thus is 
theoretically able to eavesdrop at a greater distance than the communicating devices would normally allow. This 
does not remove the distance limitation of the RFID carrier signal but does improve the effectiveness of an 
attack whilst still requiring the attack to occur during the relatively short communication window. 
The interception of a RFID systems communication is not the only measure of a successful eavesdropping attack 
with the translation of the captured signal to usable information becoming an integral measure of success. Due 
to the nature of RFID communications and the limiting factor of range, the distance between attacker, reader and 
tag mean that there are three versions of eavesdropping that must be considered. To allow further discussion of 
the distances and separate scenarios in this section I will define the following : 
• Distance (R) – The distance which the transmission of the Reader may be detected 
• Distance (T) – The distance which the transmission of the Tag may be detected 
• Signal (R) – The signal produced by the Reader 
• Signal (T) – The signal produced by the Tag 
The scenarios involving RFID eavesdropping may be described as: 
• A detection attack – whereby an attacker may detect a transmission but be unable to reliably translate 
the transmission signal into usable data. 
• A transmission only attack – whereby due to the differential in transmission range between a reader and 
a tag the eavesdropper is only able to detect and translate the readers signal 
• A complete attack – whereby the eavesdropper is able to record and translate both the reader and tag 
communication. 
Obviously the ideal demonstration of an eavesdropping attack on an RFID system would be a complete attack 
occurring when both Signal (R) and Signal (T) are detected which may only occur when the eavesdropper is in a 
range inside both Distance (R) and Distance (T) (Juels, 2006). As the success of such an attack combines the 
elements required in both a transmission only and a detection attack it is this scenario that my experiment was 
designed to demonstrate. The first stage in this experiment was to first ensure that a signal was available for 
interception and that this signal was known and replicable to ensure that the conditions for success in the 
experiment might be explicitly defined. To this end a basic RFID system consisting of an RFID reader and 
single EPC tag was setup within a controlled environment as detailed in the figure below. 
 
 
Figure 2  – Eavesdropping Baseline Experimental Setup 
 
To ensure the correctness of the setup two separate measures were taken: 
• A capture of the RFID Signal was undertaken via the Spectrum Analyser 
• The RFID Reader was setup to log the communication between itself and the EPC tag to a CSV file. 
 RESULTS 
This setup was tested on three separate occasions to ensure identical result and one of which is detailed in the 
next few figures. Figure three below is a screen capture of the cumulative wave of the RFID communication 
over the baseline test period showing that the RFID reader was indeed transmitting over the correct spectrum 
with the graph centred on the 915Mhz frequency. 
 
 
Figure 3 – Cumulative Waveform 
 
Figure four is a snapshot of the spectrum analyser demonstrating the tags response by the second smaller peak 
on the right of the figure below. 
 
 
Figure 4 – Individual Snapshot during communication 
 
And finally table one details the inventory of the RFID reader which was recovered from the CSV log on the 
laptop. The table below illustrates the output from this logfile and demonstrates that the test tag selected for the 
eavedropping and baseline tests was successfully detected in each test. 
Table 1 – Inventory Log from Baseline Test 
 
Time Tag ID 
27/07/2008 12:02:09PM  00 27 32 20 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 02 
27/07/2008 12:05:14PM  00 27 32 20 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 02 
27/07/2008 12:06:01PM  00 27 32 20 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 02 
27/07/2008 12:06:57PM  00 27 32 20 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 02 
27/07/2008 12:08:10PM  00 27 32 20 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 02 
27/07/2008 12:09:29PM  00 27 32 20 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 02 
27/07/2008 12:12:32PM  00 27 32 20 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 02 
 
Now that the baseline test was conducted and the reference data was set, the development of an device able to   
eavesdrop could occur with the assistance of the SCIS Reasearch Support Engineers. The developed device used 
a 915Mhz dipole antenna to read the signal and transport it to the microcontroller as seen in the figure five. 
 
 
Figure 5 - The RFID Eavesdropping Device 
 
The device above was the programmed via the COM port interface with an algortithm which setup the device 
and translated the signals received into a binary output following the encoding standard used on the EPC 
complaint tags (Auto-ID, 2002). This output was then passed out via the COM port interface and logged onto a 
connected laptop for storage and later analysis an example of this output is shown in figure six below. 
  
Figure 6 –  Sample output from eavesdropping device 
 
DISCUSSION 
Given the output the next stage was to look for certain patterns to identify the communication stream between 
the RFID Reader and Tag. The obvious start point for this search was the ScrollAllID (00110100) command as 
this  string is used by EPC Standard compliant readers to ask all EPC Tags within range to respond with a 
standard identification string (Auto-ID Center, 2002). Using this command string as a reference point the entire 
Reader command string was then broken down as detailed in the subsequent table and then this was matched 
against the output again and matches have been highlighted in Table 2 and Figure 7. 
 
Table 2 – Expected results for RFID Reader Inventory String 
Field Number of Bits Description Expected Value 
Colour 
Code 
PREAMBL ? Period of no RF Transmission     
CLKSYNC 20 clock synchronization 00000000000000000000   
SOF 1 Start of Frame indicator 1   
CMD 8 Command sent to tag 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0   
Odd Parity (CMD) 1 Odd Parity of previous field 0   
PTR 8 Pointer to a location 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Odd Parity (PTR) 1 Odd Parity of previous field 1   
LEN 8 Length of data in VALUE field 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Odd Parity (LEN) 1 Odd Parity of previous field 1   
VALUE variable VALUE 0 1 1   
Odd Parity (VALUE) 1 Odd Parity of previous field 1   
Odd Parity               1 Odd Parity of previous odd parity bits 0   
EOF 1 End of Frame indicator 1   
Starting Program.... 
Waiting for input.... 
Input Detected... Initiating Read 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
FINISH 
  
 
Figure 7 – Eavesdropping output mapped against RFID ReaderInventory String  
 
After the Reader transmission had been successfully identified the next step was to repeat the process to identify 
the Tag response. The expected response is detailed in table 3 below and is followed by figure 8 showing the 
fields mapped onto the attackers output with the reader strings highlighted as a block in grey. 
 
Table 3 – Expected Responser from test tag to Reader Inventory String 
Field Number of Bits Description Expected Value (HEX) 
Colour 
Code 
PREAMBLE 8       
CRC-CITT (16) 16 CRC-CITT of the Tag ID 9D F1   
TAG ID Variable Tag identifier in MSB --> LSB 
Binary fashion 
 00 27 32 20 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 
02   
 
Starting Program.... 
Waiting for input.... 
Input Detected... Initiating Read 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
FINISH 
 
Figure 8 – Eavesdropping output mapped against RFID Tag Response String  
 
From the above sequence it may be seen that a complete eavesdropping attack is viable on EPC Gen One 
standard based RFID technology. The device constructed to record the signals was created for around $100 
Australian Dollars but that cost may be reduced with further design revision, materials and construction 
methods. The demonstrable ability to eavesdrop on such technologies opens implementations of the standard up 
to a range of potential threats. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has demonstrated a successful eavesdropping attack against a Generation One EPC setup using a 
custom made device, illustrating the ease in which such an attack may be carried out. The results revealed that 
EPC Gen One communications are carried out completely in the clear, and may be intercepted by anyone within 
range of the transmissions. This reinforces earlier assertions by other researchers who have cited such attacks as 
viable without providing proofs (Sarma et al., 2002; Juels, 2006).  
Whilst it has been argued that such an attack would become a more difficult exercise with an appropriate 
encryption added to the standard it is notable that the second generation of the standard still lacks this feature 
(EPC Global, 2005). This may be attributable to the difficulty of implementing a secure encryption method that 
may be implemented on a fast response – computational limited environment such as that offered by passive 
RFID systems. Such limitiations on processing power mean that new and innovative encryption schemes are 
required that will allow for secure communication within small operational windows and achieveable with 
limited resources.  
A range of schemes purport to have the solution to this challenge but none has yet to gain acceptance into the 
EPC standard, a standard which has few if any rivals in its efforts and thus remains a default choice for 
inventory based systems. Unfortunately, until the standard adopts even a basic encryption algorithm all 
transmissions conducted with RFID equipment must be considered to be insecure, and thus it is clear that 
current implementations may well prove easy targets for attacks. It would therefore be suggested that 
implementers of this standard need to supplement the operation of the standard with their own encryption 
selection to attempt to  avoid such attacks. 
Starting Program.... 
Waiting for input.... 
Input Detected... Initiating Read 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
FINISH 
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